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Abstract
The current IASP definition of pain has come under renewed criticisms recently. There is a new momentum for its revision as
reflected by the fact that IASP has now a Presidential Task Force dedicated to look into whether there is enough warrant to update
the definition. I critically review all the major criticisms of the current definition in detail, and raise new difficulties rarely discussed
before. I show that none of the major criticisms has enough warrant to force us to substantially revise the current definition.
Combined with the discussion of the new difficulties, there is nonetheless a need to restate the definition using slightly different
terminology that will make the original intent of the current definition clearer and more precise. A restatement of the definition is
proposed and its potential is discussed in light of some empirical questions that remain.
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1. Introduction
The IASP definition of pain has not changed since its first
publication in 1979.12,25,29 It has survived various criticisms
raised in mid-to-late 1990s initiated by Anand and Craig.5 Similar
criticisms and defenses continue to be voiced.6,11,16–18,26,
36,39,41–43,46Williams and Craig47 have recently raised the volume
considerably with new criticisms and offered an alternative
definition. Cohen et al.14 have also expressed their unhappiness
with the current IASP definition and offered their own alternative.
These then have gathered various reactions and produced
counterresponses.2,3,7,19,20,33–35,44,45,48–50 As a result, IASP has
formed a Presidential Task Force just to look into whether there is
indeed any warrant to update the current definition. This work is
still underway.
It is important to critically evaluate the criticisms directed at the
IASP definition if we want to assess correctly whether there is any
need to update it. In what follows, I will go over themajor criticisms
directed at this definition and assess their merit. My hope is that
a rigorous critical review will be helpful to the members of the
current Task Force andwill prove useful for the profession at large
by stimulating further critical and careful thinking that is much
needed at this point in time.
2. Does the IASP definition require self-report?
Perhaps, the most influential and widely discussed criticism was
the one raised by Anand and Craig5 in 1996:
“In its present form, however, the definition of pain challenges
our understanding of pain because it does not apply to living
organisms that are incapable of self-report. This includes
newborn and older infants, small children, mentally retarded,
comatose, demented, or verbally handicapped individuals,
and all primate and non-primate animals.” (1996: 3)
As recently as 2017, Anand4 continued to press for this very
complaint:
“This definition requires patients to describe their pain, by
default establishing the primacy of self-report as a ‘gold
standard.’ Although widely accepted across all healthcare
professions and biomedical disciplines, this definition lacks
applicability to non-verbal populations and ignores the
cognitive and social dimensions of pain.” (2017: 1438)
As well, Anand here joins Williams and Craig47 in faulting the
current IASP definition for not including the “cognitive and social”
components of pain:
“First, acknowledging only sensory and emotional features
excludes major and clinically important characteristics, in
particular, cognitive, and social components. These compo-
nents are often considered to be characteristic of chronic pain
and can be overlooked in understanding acute pain, despite
much evidence to the contrary.” (Williams and Craig 2016:
2421)
I will begin by discussing the charge that the IASPdefinition “does
not apply to living organisms that are incapable of self-report.”
Despite receiving a lot of attention and generating heated debate, it
is important to understand that this criticism is based on a simple
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logical fallacy—a fallacy of confusing an or-statement (a disjunction)
with an and-statement (a conjunction). Why this has not been
noticed by the parties to the debate before is a historical and
sociological curiosity. (Wright49 points out this too). Let me explain.
The current definition has the form of a disjunction:
“An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of
such damage. (IASP 1979/2011)”
Let us make the form explicit by rewriting it explicitly in disjunctive
form and expanding the determiner “such”:
A pain is:
(1) an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage,
OR
(2) an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience
described in terms of actual or potential tissue damage.
Please note that this rewriting is simply the result of making the
logical structure of the formulation explicit. So, there should be no
controversy about this. The form of the definition is inclusive
disjunction of the form: “p or q (or both).” Such a disjunction is true
if, and only if, at least one disjunct is true—false otherwise. (Each
individual propositionmakingupadisjunction is called a “disjunct.”)
So, in the above definition, each disjunct by itself provides
a sufficient (but not a necessary) condition for something to be
a pain. The necessary condition for something to be a pain is
provided by the inclusive disjunction itself: the truth of [(1) or (2)] is
both necessary and sufficient for something to be a pain. This is
what it means for the formulation to provide a taxonomic definition
for pain. Such a definition of pain is incorrect if it fails to collect all
and only those things that are intuitively pains: it fails if there are
pains that are not captured by [(1) or (2)]. It also fails if there are
things that satisfy [(1) or (2)] but are intuitively not pains. It is
important to emphasize that the IASP definition is a taxonomic
definitionofpain, not just of severeor clinically problematic pain: it is
supposed to cover all and only those things we correctly call
“pains”—however slight or intense and however transient or
persistent they may be.
It must be obvious that according to the IASP definition, all
individuals who satisfy (1) count as having a pain, whether these
individuals are “newborn and older infants, small children,
mentally retarded, comatose, demented, or verbally handi-
capped individuals” or indeed whether they are “primate and
nonprimate animals.” But obviously, clause (1) does not require
any capability of self-report including linguistic report. There is
simply no part of (1) that makes it applicable only to subjects that
are capable of self-report. It is clearly not part of (1) that only those
who can actually and verbally associate their experiences with
tissue damage are capable of pain. The point of the use of
“associated” will be explained below. But, here I merely point out
that interpreting (1) as requiring actual verbal association by the
subjects would be patently absurd, uncharitable, and unfair,
bordering on the intentional misrepresentation. No verbal act of
actual association by the agent is required by (1). I take this to be
self-evident. This simple fact by itself refutes the claim made by
Anand, Williams, and Craig, and by all the participants in the
debatewho assumed the same (and there were a lot of them even
when they were critical).
On the face of it, Anand, Williams, and Craig think that the term
“described” used in the second disjunct makes the whole
definition not applicable to nonverbal individuals. But this is
a mistake—a mistake of treating a disjunction as a conjunction (a
conjunction is an and-statement, where each individual conjunct
needs to be true for the conjunction as a whole to be true).
There is a further issue about whether the use of “described”
in (2) does in fact make (2) itself inapplicable to nonverbal
individuals as assumed by Anand, Williams, and Craig. This is
by no means obvious either, and I will get back to it below. But
let me first briefly inquire into why Anand, Williams, and Craig,
and others were so easily misled to make this mistake. As is
well known, the Note to the definition contains the following
passage:25
“Many people report pain in the absence of tissue damage
or any likely pathophysiological cause; usually this happens
for psychological reasons. There is usually no way to
distinguish their experience from that due to tissue damage
if we take the subjective report. If they regard their
experience as pain and if they report it in the same ways as
pain caused by tissue damage, it should be accepted as
pain.” (IASP 1979/2011)
The wish to properly handle the concern that motivated this
passage (and the second disjunct in the main definition) was one
of the most significant driving forces of the IASP definition. The
resulting definition was radical and progressive precisely because
it was geared to kill a widespread but narrow biomedical
conception of pain. According to this conception, patients with
chronic pain with no identifiable pathophysiological cause must
have somehow “all made it up in their mind,” and therefore their
pain is not real but must somehow be the product of their
overactive imagination. As a result, these patients were likely to be
ignored or denied proper care and treatment by the medical
community. According to many, this problem has somewhat
diminished (partly thanks to IASP’s persistent campaign) but still
exists today.
The last sentence in the quoted passage says (of the patient
with chronic pain without any identifiable pathophysiological
cause) that “if they regard their experience as pain and if they
report it in the same ways as pain caused by tissue damage, it
should be accepted as pain.” The crucial thing to notice is that it is
somewhat easy to get the faulty impression that this sentence
implies that “if they do not (or, cannot) report it in the same ways
as pain caused by tissue damage, then it should not be accepted
as pain.” I suspect that Anand andCraig (and otherswho followed
suit in their footsteps) did think that this is indeed the implication of
the Note, and this is probably why they thought that the IASP
definition requires self-report. But if so, this is another logical
fallacy: a conditional statement of the form ‘if p then q’ does not
imply “if not-p then not-q.” This is to say that it would be amistake
to interpret the passage in the Note as implying that if there are
individuals who cannot report or communicate their pains, their
experiences are not pain. Not only is this inference not logically
warranted by the passage, it would also be quite uncharitable to
read it as implying this. The passage is simply concerned about
those “many people [who] report pain in the absence of tissue
damage or any likely pathophysiological cause.” There is no
suggestion of any sort in the passage about those patients who
do not or cannot report their pain—the passage is simply not
talking about the nonverbal. To interpret this as implying that the
passage is making a positive claim about the nonverbal individual
is patently not warranted.
The need to add (2) to (1) in the form of a disjunction was
prompted by the concerns expressed in the Note. There are
many cases where an individual is in pain without any identifiable
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pathophysiology, which is to say, without any associated actual
or potential tissue damage. These individuals would therefore not
be covered by (1) alone. Hence, (2) comes into the definition by
way of providing a disjunctive extension to (1): even in the
absence of any associated actual or potential tissue damage (or
any identifiable pathophysiology), the experiences of these
individuals are genuine pain in so far as these unpleasant sensory
and emotional experiences are describable in the same ways as
those experiences in individuals with associated tissue damage.
Describability does not require anybody’s doing any actual
description. The point of using “described” (or requiring describ-
ability) in the definition was to capture the idea that an unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience is a genuine pain if, and only if,
it shares the “usual sensory [and affective] qualities” of pain
associatedwith actual or potential tissue damage. In other words,
describability comes into the picture only as a proxy for
phenomenological similarity—similarity to the collection of
sensory and affective qualities distinctive of pain experiences
associated with tissue damage. That this was the main idea
(rather than actual linguistic description) is quite clear if we look at
Merskey’s32 own statement of it:
“It was evident that patients with psychological distress had
experiences of pain in the body which resembled our
experiences with physical illness, and both types of experience
had to be regarded as pain, despite the lack of a physical
cause for some of the former” (1994: S75).
So, the criticism and the persistent complaint that the current
IASP definition of pain requires or implies self-report or that it does
not apply to nonverbal organisms has no material foundation and
is based on fallacious (and almost certainly, uncharitable)
interpretation of the definition and the accompanying Note.
3. Does using “unpleasant” trivialize severe
chronic pain?
Before turning to the question of whether the IASP definition
neglects the cognitive or social components of pain, I want to
briefly touch upon the second criticism of Williams and Craig:47
“Second, characterizing the experience simply as ‘unpleasant’
falls short: most acute or chronic clinically problematic pain is
more than “unpleasant,” and the term potentially trivializes
severe pain.” (2016: 2421)
This is one of the 3 major reasons that Williams and Craig give
for updating the IASP definition. To address this, they propose to
replace the term “unpleasant” with “distressing.”
The first thing to note is that the IASP definition is a definition of
“pain,” not of “severe pain,” or not of “acute or chronic clinically
problematic pain.” If you consider the entire history of the world,
the majority of actual token pains that have ever occurred and will
ever occur are almost certainly not “acute or chronic clinically
problematic pains.” Indeed, think of the number of times on an
average day that an average person hurts herself. A majority of
these pains are not severe (luckily) and are not clinically important
or problematic. How would you respond to someone (say, from
NOAA) who objects that the definition of “wind” falls short
because most tropical storms and hurricanes are more than “a
current of air blowing from a particular direction” (dictionary.
com)? I take it that IASP as an organization is in the business of
understanding pain, not just “clinically problematic
pain”—although the latter may be its primary focus for
assessment, treatment, and health care policy purposes.
Butmore importantly, all sensory experiences produced by our
sensory modalities come with a hedonic valence that can be
modeled at the psychological level as a binary scale with
continuous intensity values that vary from positive, passing
through neutral, to negative. In other words, our sensations are
always glossedwith a hedonic/affective tone—negative or neutral
or positive (this has been evident in affective neurosciences and
emotion theory for quite some time10,27,28). English has a positive
term (pleasant) that denotes the positive valence directly; but
unfortunately, English has only a negative term obtained by
negating the positive term (unpleasant) to denote the negative
hedonic valence. Thus, the members of the original IASP
Taxonomic Subcommittee did not have much choice in
specifying this aspect of pain in a definition: the word “un-
pleasant” in the current definition is simply an umbrella term to
state that pain is a negatively valenced sensory experience. It
goes without saying, of course, that the range varies in intensity
so that most clinically problematic pains tend to be quite severe.
These are covered by the definition. Arguing against it on the
ground that it trivializes severe pain misses the point of
a taxonomic definition.
Nevertheless, we should be open to find better terms to
express the fact that pains are negatively valenced experiences
as far as their affective character is concerned.
4. Is pain social?
Another major complaint voiced by Anand, Williams, and Craig,
and others is that the current IASP definition “…excludes major
and clinically important characteristics, in particular, cognitive,
and social components” (Williams andCraig 2016: 2421). Indeed,
Williams and Craig47 propose the following definition to replace
the current definition:
“Pain is a distressing experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage with sensory, emotional, cognitive,
and social components.” (2016: 2420)
The claim seems to be that pain is necessarily cognitive and
social, and by not mentioning these essential components or
aspects of pain, the current IASP definition fails to provide
necessary conditions for any experience to count as pain. Let us
separate and restate these claims:
(C) Any pain experience is, by its essential constitution,
cognitive.
(S) Any pain experience is, by its essential constitution, social.
Are (C) and (S) true? We cannot answer this question without
understanding what these claims mean.
It is by no means clear what they mean. Note that we have
a fairly clear idea about what it means for an experience to be
sensory, unpleasant, or emotional. An experience is sensory only
if it functions to detect and discriminate various energy forms
(“adequate stimulus”) through relatively specialized neural sys-
tems. We can do psychophysical experiments to delineate the
relevant phenomenological (sensory) quality space associated
with sensory-discriminative information embedded in the expe-
rience. Similarly, a sensory experience is unpleasant only if it has
a hedonic valence that functions in one’s mental economy in
whatever way the valence information is supposed to function.
The hedonic valence of a sensory experience is usually manifest
in one’s experiential phenomenology and can be studied using
psychophysical techniques. Emotions are more complex, but
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there is not much mystery about what it means for an experience
to be emotional.
So, what does it mean for a sensory and affective experience to
be social? Is sociality an essential phenomenological constituent
in the way sensory and affective qualities are essential constit-
uents in any pain experience? To the extent to which this question
makes sense, the answer is “No.” Williams and Craig claim to
present empirical evidence from the biopsychosocial modeling of
pain phenomena. But as far as I can tell, all this evidence is
evidence for the claim that social and cognitive (as well as
psychological and biological) factors greatly influence pain
experiences. I am pretty sure that this claim is true, and the
research behind it is solid. But evidence for causal influence is not
evidence for essential constitution. There are many other factors
that causally influence pain experiences. For instance, there is
now accumulating empirical evidence that weather conditions
directly influence many types of pain.1,13,40 Suppose the causal
influence of weather conditions can be systematically demon-
strated to be a factor for how one experiences pain quite
generally. Should we complain that the IASP definition neglects
themeteorological component of pain experiences? Such a claim
would border on the unintelligible: we have a good understanding
of what it means for meteorological conditions to influence pain
experiences, but we have no understanding of what it means for
meteorological conditions to be constituents of a pain
experience.
Scientific theorizing is all about causal mechanisms. Knowl-
edge of causal mechanisms is empirical and quite crucial to
manipulate outcomes in treatment and health care policy
settings. But we should not confuse scientific theory construction
and its application in clinical settings with the task of providing
a taxonomic definition for the term “pain” that will collect all and
only pains as intuitively understood by the scientists and the folk
alike.
5. Is pain cognitive?
Evaluating claim (C) above is trickier. In the absence of a nontrivial
working understanding of what “cognitive” means in this context,
its extended discussion, I am afraid, will be controversial and not
very useful. Still, I would like to make a few observations. First,
note that “cognitive” does not mean “conscious.” It is relatively
uncontroversial that we can have cognitive processes that are not
conscious. Arguably, we can also have noncognitive processes
that are conscious. Cognition has traditionally been compared
and contrasted with sensation (or feelings). Having a homeostatic
sensation of thirst or hunger, a gustatory sensation of saltiness,
an olfactory sensation of a rose, a bodily sensation of pain or
orgasm, etc., have all thought to be distinct from thinking,
judging, remembering, imagining, belief acquisition, recognition,
etc. The motivation for thinking that they are distinct is not that
they do not influence each other, but rather that they are
differently constituted and that they belong to different mental
categories. The intuition is that a sensation (or a feeling) is a very
different kind of thing than a thought or judgment. The standard
way of cashing out this intuition has been that cognition involves
the use and application of concepts, whereas having a mere
sensation does not constitutionally necessitate having a concept.
One can have a taste of something, thus have a conscious taste
sensation, without being able to recognize or categorize what it is
that one tastes, thus without being able to exercise any (nontrivial)
concept applicable to what one tastes. This is not to say that
expectations or perceived contextual factors will not have any
influence onwhat one’s sensation feels like, but it is to say that the
having of a sensation is not the having of a (concept-involving)
cognition. These are 2 different things, however, closely related to
each other. Very few people would claim that the distinction
between sensation, perception, and cognition is sharp and well
delineated. Rather, it seems that there is a continuum of
increasingly less analog information processing. Still, the lack of
clear boundaries does not imply that there are no useful
distinctions to be made between sensation, perception, and
cognition. When we put the matter this way, the question
becomes: where do we put pains along this continuum?
Whatever the ultimate specific answer is, one thing seems clear
to me: not in the cognition category. Hence, we should reject (C)
above.
Anand,Williams, andCraig talk about the cognitive component
or dimension of pain. Perhaps, they are thinking of pains as
constituted by different elements: pains are constituted by both
sensory and cognitive elements (among others). But what does
this mean? What is the cognitive element such that each and
every pain necessarily has it? If we accept that being cognitive
implies concept involvement, then the capability of feeling pain
will require the possession of some concepts. Apart from the
difficulty of specifying what these concepts are, there is the real
danger of overintellectualizing pain. We have animals, newborns,
infants, cognitively incapacitated or handicapped organisms, or
elderly with severe dementia. Intuitively, these groups seem
capable of having pain but it is not clear at all whether they are
capable of exercising the relevant range of concepts (whatever
they are). It would be ironic to accuse Anand, Williams, and Craig
of ignoring these populations—I am sure they have no such
intentions (on the contrary!). But if the concept-involving in-
terpretation of “cognitive” is not what they have in mind, what do
they mean by it? They do not say. It seems to me that having
observed the great efficacy of various forms of cognitive therapies
for decades and the evidence coming from studies of pain
modulation, they want to say something like: cognitive factors
(what one believes, expects, anticipates, fears, hopes, wants,
etc.) greatly influence pain experiences, hence pains are the kinds
ofmental phenomena that can be strongly influenced by cognitive
factors. If this is all there is to their claim, I strongly agree with
them. But this is no grounds to make the constitutive claim made
by (C) above, and criticize the IASP definition for ignoring it. A lot of
things causally influence a lot of other things. Detailing these
influences is what scientific theories are for—a taxonomic
definition is not a scientific theory.
6. What does “associated with” mean?
The current IASP definition does not have the difficulties and
problems attributed to it by Anand, Williams, and Craig. Does it
have other problems or difficulties? I will discuss 3 in this section
and next. The first problem iswith the term “associatedwith” used
in (1). If we interpret it loosely in the British empiricist sense in
which association is a matter of certain ideas following certain
other ideas depending on the statistical correlations observed or
past reinforcements, then it is not difficult to find counterexamples
to the current definition. Take somebody who was traumatized
when young by a dental surgery that went wrong. She now
cannot stand the audiovisual presentation of a dentist drill—she
finds her experience unpleasant. Take such an audiovisual
experience of hers. This experience is sensory, unpleasant, and
emotional associated with tissue damage: a clear case where (1)
is satisfied. So, the current IASP definition dictates that this very
audiovisual experience is pain. But clearly it is not. As a taxonomic
definition, the satisfaction of [(1) or (2)] is meant to provide
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a sufficient (as well as necessary) condition for anything to be
a pain. Clearly it does not do that, as things now stand. Onemight
think that the definition can be tightened and made immune to
this sort of counterexample by replacing “sensory” with “somato-
sensory.” But there can be somatosensory fear conditioning
too—take somebody who is deaf and blind, but traumatized
similarly. This person now cannot stand the somatosensory
sensation of vibration associated with a dentist drill and the tissue
damage it’s caused. The problem these counterexamples point
to is not with the word “sensory,” rather it is with the word
“associated” understood loosely.
We can begin to see where the solution lies if we attend to the
reasons for why the phrase was needed in the first place. Clearly,
the 3 conditions for a pain experience—namely, being un-
pleasant, sensory, and emotional—are not jointly sufficient. What
is needed is a criterion that would delineate the target sensations
from all the rest that satisfy the 3 conditions. In standard
psychophysical research, this is done by figuring out what the
“adequate stimulus” is for the sensory system under investiga-
tion. For pain, the intuitive idea that needs to be captured is that
pain sensations typically or paradigmatically arise out of noxious
stimulation of bodily tissue that is apt to cause tissue damage. In
other words, the term “associated with” was used to narrow
down the class of unpleasant, sensory, and emotional experi-
ences to only those that are in fact pain experiences on the basis
of its adequate stimulus. The form of association here is the same
to be found in the association between, say, the frequency of
electromagnetic energy forms impinging on retinal cells and the
resulting sensory colour experiences. If we interpret this phrase in
the IASP definition in this way, the counterexample given above
would be avoided: the audiovisual experience of a dentist drill
would be excluded by the definition because this sort of
experience does not typically or paradigmatically result from
actual or potential tissue damage. In other words, we look at the
kind of experience this particular experience is a member of, and
ask if it paradigmatically results from noxious stimuli apt to cause
tissue damage. The answer is “no”: the stimulus for it is not
adequate stimulus for pain. If we keep this interpretation of
“associated with” in mind when reading the current IASP
definition, there is no need to revise the definition. If we want to
bring clarity and precision and want to avoid misunderstanding,
we may revise (1) explicitly in this way:
(1*) An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience that
paradigmatically results from actual or potential tissue
damage.
I realize that the term “paradigmatically” may sound a bit
technical. Words like “typically” or “normally” can probably serve
the same intended function, but I will stick with “paradigmatically”
for present purposes because it makes the intended reading
clearer.
Above I have mentioned that the term “described” in (2) was
meant in the “describable” sense and that no act of actual
description by anybody was intended. I suggested that the
introduction of this clausewas needed because (1) did not secure
a necessary condition for an experience to be pain—although it
was sufficient. There are many genuine pain experiences that
come about in the absence of any identifiable potential or actual
tissue damage. The intuitive idea was that these experiences can
be brought into the scope of the definition by the disjunctive
addition of (2). (2) on its own provides a sufficient condition for
pain. The overall intent, then, was that the disjunction of (1) and
(2), [(1) or (2)], would provide both necessary and sufficient
condition for any experience to count as pain.
I have also suggested that describability gets into the picture
merely as a reliable proxy for phenomenological similarity
(similarity in terms of sensory and affective qualities)—as Merskey
originally seems to have had in mind. If so, we can restate the
second clause more explicitly and directly, bypassing the
describability condition altogether:
(2*) An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience that is of
the same kind or similar to an experience (that paradigmatically
results from actual or potential tissue damage) in terms of its
sensory and affective qualities.
Putting (1*) and (2*) together will give us a cleaner version of the
IASP definition that I believe has been the intent behind the
current formulation all along (see my 2017 for an extended
argument to this effect):7,8
(IASP*) An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience that
paradigmatically results from actual or potential tissue
damage, or is of the same kind or similar to such an experience
in terms of its sensory and affective qualities.
7. What do all pains share in common?
This reformulation of the current IASP definition is free of the
problems raised and discussed so far. But it faces a new
challenge. As far as I am aware, the difficulty and the problem
associated with it was first raised by Howard Fields in an article
published in 1999 in the context of a discussion of the affective
dimension of pain:7,9,23,49
“By this official definition, it isn’t clear whether the unpleasant
sensation reported by my nerve injury patients is pain, and in
fact they often say it isn’t pain. Although there has been tissue
damage, in that their nerve is injured, the words such patients
use to describe the sensation do not correspond to stimuli
associated with actual or potential tissue damage. This
contrasts to the reported experience of patients with pains
resulting from common tissue damaging insults. Such patients
use words like ‘burning’, ‘cutting’ or ‘stabbing’ that evoke
images of tissue being damaged. On the other hand, patients
with nerve injury often report sensations that are unfamiliar and
they use words that don’t suggest threat or damage. Is their
sensation pain even if they are uncomfortable using that word
to describe it? Should we try to shoehorn their experience into
categories that we have contrived?” (Fields 1999: S62)
Fields seems to raise 2 questions here that we need to identify
and separate from each other. One is that the first clause in the
definition may not be sufficient. Fields points out actual cases
where many neuropathic pain patients seem to satisfy all the
conditions laid out in (1) or (1*) but may still not be in pain as they
describe their own experiences avoiding using the term “pain.”
This is an important difficulty that points to a need to further clarify
the relation between the experience and the tissue damage
assumed in (1) or (1*). (1*) can be interpreted as covering any
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience that results from
any sort of actual or potential tissue damage—in which case
Fields’ patients are problem cases due to the nerve injuries they
sustain.
The subtle but important point to make here to handle this
difficulty is to pay attention to how “paradigmatically” is meant to
function in the definition. The idea here is to fix the scope of
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experiences in (1*) to those that result from only those noxious
stimuli that constitute “adequate stimuli,” ie, stimuli that stimulate
nociceptors properly—in the way they are evolutionarily designed
to function.42 We cannot use this technical vocabulary in the
definition, but we can read “paradigmatically” in such a way as to
exclude experiences that result from nerve injury or disease or
dysfunction. In other words, the intent is to restrict the first clause,
by this use of “paradigmatically,” to collect only nociceptive pain,
in other words, only pains solely due to the normal functioning of
the nociceptive mechanisms as these were biologically designed
to function. If we do this, the patients Fields has in mind are no
longer counterexamples to the sufficiency of (1*). On the other
hand, to the extent to which these patients’ experiences are pain
(to the extent to which they are willing to use “pain” to describe
their own experiences), they are so in virtue of their experiences’
satisfying the second clause—just as it was intended. Neuro-
pathic and nociplastic pains—in so far as they are pains—are
genuinely pains in virtue of being phenomenologically similar to
nociceptive pains. The idea is that despite their involving different
mechanisms and aetiologies, they are all pains in virtue of having
sufficient phenomenological similarity to a paradigm group. This
is the upshot of the IASP definition as reformulated here and
seems to capture intuitively well both the folk and clinical/scientific
usage of the term “pain.”
However, Fieldsmay be raising a second and deeper question,
which should be faced seriously and squarely by any proposal
that is similar to the IASP definition7,23,49: Are there unpleasant
sensory experiences that are typically accepted in the clinical
literature as pains (and are not due to known pathophysiology)
that escape the basic intent of the IASP definition even under its
proposed reformulation? Many forms of neuropathic and
especially nociplastic pains (eg, experiences involved in fibro-
myalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, irritable bowel
syndrome, and primary migraine)may have sensory and affective
qualities that are not sufficiently similar to nociceptive pains. It
may be possible to classify some of these experiences under
dysesthesia. But how can we be sure that all pains, or rather all
experiences commonly accepted as pains, are sufficiently
phenomenologically similar to pains due to normal nociception?
This is a difficult question to answer. Part of the reason is the
inherent subjectivity of pain experiences—the sensory and
affective qualities of pain experiences (indeed of any experiences)
are accessible only from a first-person point of view as long as we
lack the means to determine what they are from an objective
perspective. Nevertheless, the question is ultimately an empirical
one: we need to empirically investigate the quality spaces within
these experience kinds, and compare and contrast them to come
upwith a similarity matrix. We then need to determine how people
use “pain” vis-a`-vis this matrix to find out what quality subspace it
carves out. Various psychophysical techniques combined with
clinical experience can be used to tackle this ques-
tion.21,22,24,30,31 There are also other techniques that attempt to
combine the first-person and third-person methodologies.37,38
Note, however, that although the question is difficult and
ultimately empirical, it need not be presently settled for definitional
purposes. The definition of “pain” expressing our common
semantic understanding of the term is not a theory and may
involve exactly the same amount of vagueness there may be in
the phenomenon itself. In some (hopefully rare) occasions, there
may be no fact of the matter whether the phenomenological
similarity demanded by the second clause is good enough and of
the right kind for an experience to count as pain—certainly further
complicated by lack of relevant descriptors. Even the patients or
the subjects themselves may not be able to tell. If this is correct, it
means that there is a certain amount of indeterminacy in the very
nature of pain itself as we commonly understand it. But if this
correct, we cannot capture the phenomenon with an on-and-off
definition that will treat pain as an on-and-off phenomenon. A
certain amount of indeterminacy in our definition, in other words,
may be the correct thing to incorporate, and the IASP definition as
reformulated does just that.
As things now stand, does anybody have any better answer to
the question: in virtue of what do neuropathic and nociplastic
pains count as pains? The IASP definition (as reformulated)
seems to deliver the best answer: in virtue of sufficiently
resembling standard nociceptive pains in crucial respects. This
may not be exactly correct; but if not, we need to discover this
empirically, and the results might be significant. Perhaps, we
might find out, some experiences that have been standardly
categorized under neuropathic, nociplastic, or idiopathic “pains”
are not pains after all. Conversely, some unpleasant sensory
experiences that have been usually categorized as not pain (eg,
some intense itches, certain intensely unpleasant bodily sensa-
tions associated for instance with dizziness, vomiting, etc.) might
turn out to be better categorized as pains. The IASP definition
does not close these possibilities—on the contrary!
So, despite there being a lingering worry as to whether (IASP*)
will accurately collect all persistent or chronic pain cases,
especially due to neuropathy or dysfunction of the nociceptive
system, the way to tackle the worry is to read the definition as
open to (indeed, as encouraging) further empirical investigation.
When clinicians and medical professionals talk about pain, they
have in mind chronic pain, or more generally, pain as a health
problem, as something that needs to be controlled, dealt with.
Viewed from this perspective, anchoring the understanding of
problematic pain in terms of similarity to acute nociceptive pain
due to tissue damage seems to get things the wrong way around.
Nevertheless, if pain is a natural kind such that acute, persistent,
and chronic pains are subspecies, the question arises as to what
makes them unified as pain. Phenomenological similarity of
a certain sort seems like the right answer to this question—hence
the IASP definition (see Corns15 for a sustained challenge to the
claim that pain is a natural kind.) However, this worry should
motivate further critical thinking about the need to separate the
definition of chronic pain (or certain kinds of chronic pain) from the
definition of pain.
8. Conclusion
In this work, I have defended the current IASP definition of “pain”
against the criticisms raised by Anand,Williams, and Craig. I have
argued that their criticisms do not warrant updating the IASP
definition in any fundamental way. I have then raised 3 further
criticisms.
First, the current formulation is vulnerable to counterexamples
showing that the definition does not provide sufficiency con-
ditions for pain, if “associated with” is read loosely. The remedy, I
have suggested, is to force a reading of this phrase as given by
(1*) above. I have also proposed that the definition should be
formulated without using the term “described,” which was
nothing but a dispensable proxy for phenomenological similarity
in the first place. I believe that the original framers of the current
definition had more or less this meaning in mind as captured by
(IASP*) above. Thus, I take (IASP*) to be not an update in
substance but a cleaner restatement of the original definition.
Second, I suggested that Fields’ concern that (1) or (1*) may still
not be sufficient can be handled by a certain reading of the term
“paradigmatically” restricting the clause to standard nociceptive
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pains (this term may be replaced with “typically” or “normally” as
long as we keep the intended interpretation in mind.)
Third, I pointed out that Fields’ concern can be expressed as
posing a general challenge to thedefinition itself in this reformulated
version: Are all experiences regularly categorized under the label
“pain” sufficiently similar to nociceptive pains in terms of their
sensory and affective qualities? Conversely, are all experiences
that are sufficiently similar to nociceptive pains standardly
categorized under the label “pain”? These questions, I believe,
are important empirical questions that cannot be settled fromone’s
armchair. Further research is required, but as things nowstand, the
IASP definition is our best guide to a common semantic
understanding of what the word “pain” means.
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